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Abstract
Technology innovation engenders products of higher qualities and reduces production costs.
This paper focuses on a two-sided platform tied with quality-improving hardware devices that
are introduced sequentially. We analyze a monopolist’s dynamic pricing strategies facing de-
creasing future production cost and strategic buyers. Findings in both the traditional (buyer-side
only) and two-sided business models show that future cost reductions raise the optimal price of
the present product, which shifts the buyer-side demand forward and mitigates intertemporal
cannibalization. Furthermore, future cost reductions may also lead to a higher optimal price for
the future product, given a substantial quality improvement. Thus, the monopolist may leverage
future cost reductions to position its product line to the high-end market. By comparing the
traditional and two-sided business models, we find that the impact of future cost reductions is
more pronounced for a two-sided platform.
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1 Introduction
The growth of platform-based business models is showing an increasingly distinct trend, in which
the platform owner directly offers hardware devices to consumers. The hardware device is the
medium necessary for consumers to interact and transact with users on the other side of the
platform. For example, the video game console is the hardware for playing the games designed by
developers for that console. Also, computers are the hardware required to run software created
by programmers for the specific operating system on a computer. This type of two-sided platform
serves consumers on one side and developers on the other side; its revenue model is often linked
directly to interactions between these two groups of users. Whereas for some platforms–such as
Windows–the hardware market has been dominated by third-party manufacturers, it has become
increasingly evident that platform owners are also tapping into the hardware market on their own.
Google has introduced its own laptop Chromebook that runs Chrome OS.1 In turn, Google sells
its platform device directly to consumers while managing application developers for Chrome OS
software development. In the tablet market, Windows Surface RT is the Microsoft-made tablet with
its own Windows 8 OS. Furthermore, some platform owners have historically excluded third-party
hardware manufacturers: Apple is a well-known case that keeps hardware production in house
offering an array of electronic products running its iOS. The video game consoles have the same
characteristics, with Sony PlayStation, Microsoft XBox, and Nintendo Wii all being platform-owned
hardware devices.
Similar to other types of IT products, the platform devices advance through waves of technolog-
ical innovation. These hardware-producing platform owners sequentially release quality-improved
products to the market. The iPad, for example, has had a number of upgrades in terms of display,
CPU, wireless capability, and other specifications; also, Windows Surface Pro has been widely an-
ticipated since the release of the Surface RT. Such patterns in introducing platform-based products
have a number of interesting implications. Inevitably, the innovation trend sparks wide interest and
online discussions regarding upcoming products. Consumers’ purchasing decisions are rarely made
only based on the existing products; more often, purchasing decisions are forward-looking with
anticipations for the pricing and quality of future products. In addition, sequential introductions
1http : //m.techcrunch.com/2012/11/26/google − reportedly − preparing − to − sell − self − branded −
chromebooks/
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of innovative products often involve dynamic pricing considerations by the platform owner. While
managing different versions of products, the platform owner tends to adopt pricing strategies that
are based on the evolving state of the market by setting price at the launch of new products, rather
than committing to a long-term pricing plan.
The platform market is driven by a multitude of forces, including the network-externality across
two sides of the platform, consumers’ strategic behaviors, and the dynamic nature of sequential
innovation; these forces interact with one another and create strategic challenges for the platform
owner. The cross-side network externality is a defining characteristic of two-sided platforms, where
more users on one side increase the attractiveness of the platform to users on the other side. In
the example of iPad, a wider iPad adoption translates to more potential downloads and revenues
for app developers in the App Store; and a bigger network of app developers adds value to iPad
users as well. Thus, cross-side network externality generates tradeoffs for the platform owner, who
uses pricing as an instrument to balance such tradeoffs and optimize revenues from both sides. In
particular, by cutting the price charged to one side, the platform might suffer some revenue loss on
this side but gain a larger user base, which in turn increases the demand, on the other side. In the
context of dynamic pricing, such tradeoffs also have important intertemporal implications. With
forward-looking consumers, the platform may need to manage the two-sided tradeoffs differently
than if consumers were myopic. In other words, the platform should evaluate whether to leverage
consumers’ valuation for future consumption and the cross-side network externality to yield higher
future revenues at some short-term loss. Furthermore, as the platform owner undertakes dynamic
pricing strategies that take into account past consumptions, characteristics of the remaining market,
and changes in production costs, the differences in the strengths of the network externality as well
as product quality over time may be critical for setting and understanding optimal prices.
Platform owner’s pricing strategies are further subject to reductions in future production costs,
which is a salient factor in the age of rapid technological advancements. Firms can effectively
cut costs for future production in many ways, which have important implications for their current
and future prices. Facing uncertain future costs, in many industries, firms engage in upfront
negotiations with their suppliers to secure a lower procurement cost for the future. The automobile
manufacturers follow different contracts to negotiate prices with suppliers of auto parts. In the
IT industry, there is a wide speculation on ways Apple contracts with its factories on the cost of
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later generations of iPhones and iPads (Opam (2011)). Besides through contractual agreements,
future cost reductions are also obtained by learning-by-doing on the manufacturer side and trust
establishment in supply chain relationships.
The main objective of this paper is to examine how reductions in future production cost of
platform-owned hardware impact the platform owner’s dynamic two-sided pricing decisions. Our
research questions highlight the important elements associated with the hardware market: What
is the effect of hardware quality improvements on the platform’s two-sided pricing strategies? How
does the platform owner intertemporally segment the hardware market to account for changes in
hardware production cost and network externality? What is the difference in a platform owner’s
strategies compared to a traditional hardware producer (without the seller-side market) in pricing
sequentially-improving devices?
Our work differentiates with existing studies on two-sided platforms by considering innovative
hardware products. Research work on two-sided pricing mechanisms and platform strategies has
been tremendously fruitful and continues to expand rapidly. However, to the best of our knowledge,
most insights thus far do not account for the platform’s role in introducing hardware devices,
which are inseparable from platform operations.2 As dominant players in the platform industry
focus more on innovating hardware devices, considerations for marketing platform-owned hardware
become increasingly relevant. Our study turns to this facet of platforms’ decision problems and
contributes novel ideas to the related literature.
We study both a traditional (“one-sided”), durable-good monopolist and a two-sided, mo-
nopolistic platform owner using economic modeling and numerical analysis. The model captures
sequential introduction of quality-improved products and dynamic pricing decisions of the mo-
nopolist. We derive the optimal price of the low-quality product in the present and that of the
high-quality product in the future; furthermore, we analyze changes in these optimal strategies
when the monopolist anticipates future cost reductions. The one-sided case provides the baseline
results for the two-sided case, in which the platform’s pricing strategies on both the buyer-side
and the seller-side involve dynamic effects of sequential introduction and cross-group network ex-
ternality. The comparison between the two cases illustrates the role of network externality in the
platform’s strategies to leverage future cost reductions and to position its products.
2The existing research findings are nevertheless applicable to platforms that rely on third-party hardware manu-
facturers or focus on service provision such as online retailers (e.g., eBay), Hulu, Pandora and others.
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In the one-sided case with interactions between the platform and buyers, we find that future
cost reductions can lead to higher optimal prices for both the low-quality product and the quality-
improved product that are introduced sequentially. The intuition is that future cost reductions
increase the profitability of the high-quality product introduced later. Thus, the firm is inclined to
encourage some buyers to delay purchase by raising the price of the low-quality product and extracts
more surplus from those who purchase early. The forward intertemporal demand shift populates
the future market with more high-valuation buyers. As a result, when the quality improvement is
sufficiently high, the firm also raises the price of the high-quality product. Overall, the firm is able
to leverage future cost reductions to push its product line toward the high-end market.
When we introduce the seller-side, the platform has a two-sided pricing problem in both periods
and needs to account for the cross-side network externality from the buyer-side to the seller-side.
The results in the one-sided case continue to hold qualitatively. Moreover, as costs decrease in the
future, the strategic adjustments of the optimal prices may be more pronounced compared to the
one-sided case. Here, the buyer-to-seller network effect raises the value of buyers, who not only
generate profits for the platform but also attract sellers to the platform. The intertemporal forward
demand shift on the buyer-side in response to future cost reductions is more pronounced in the
two-sided model, because, in addition to the incentives in the one-sided case, the platform also
derives additional seller-side revenues by expanding the buyer-side demand in the later period. In
this sense, the future profitability in response to cost reductions is further enhanced in the two-
sided case because the platform can benefit from profits on both sides of the market. The platform
is then able to raise the buyer-side price for both the low-quality and high-quality products at a
higher rate than in the one-sided case to extract higher surplus from buyers who remain to purchase
early as well as those who delay purchase.
Whereas the analytical results are based on an unidirectional network externality from the
buyers to the sellers, we add the seller-to-buyer network externality in the numerical study and
derive consistent findings. The new network externality does not alter the platform’s intertemporal
incentives because it amplifies the increases in demands on both sides in the later period. As a
result, the platform nonetheless raises the price of the low-quality product to induce buyers to delay
purchase, and it does so with a higher intensity compared to the one-sided case.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related literature in Section
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2. In Section 3, we introduce the baseline model with only the buyer-side and present the main
results. In Section 4, we extend the baseline model to the two-sided case, incorporating the cross-
side network externality of buyers on the seller-side and two-sided pricing. In Section 5, we also
incorporate the network externality exerted by sellers to the buyer-side and use numerical analysis
to show that the insights obtained in Section 4 persist. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Related Literature
Our work is most closely related to three streams of research, including the literatures on two-sided
platforms, sequential innovation, and strategic customers. To the best of our knowledge, our paper
is among the first to consider the dynamic pricing problem of a two-sided platform that sequentially
introduce innovative hardware devices in the presence of strategic consumers. Moreover, we connect
thoughts from these bodies of literature to gain further in-depth understanding on problems across
these domains.
The literature on two-sided platforms explores the platform’s pricing problem taking into con-
sideration network effects, user multi-homing, platform governance, and innovation. Earlier works
by Rochet and Tirole (2002), Rochet and Tirole (2003), Caillaud and Jullien (2003), Parker and
Alstyne (2005), and Armstrong (2006) examine different applications of two-sided markets and gen-
erate insights for the optimal fees levied on the two sides of the platform. Innovation is receiving
increasing research attention in the realm of platforms. Lin et al. (2011) study the innovation race
among sellers of a two-sided market. By analyzing innovation incentives and price competition
among sellers, they find the platform’s optimal two-sided pricing strategy. They show that the
seller-side fee may have a positive impact on sellers’ innovation incentives, while the buyer-side fee
slows down the innovation race. Boudreau (2012) conducts an empirical study on the effect of the
number of applications on software variety. He finds that an increase in the number of application
producers leads to an overall reduction in innovation incentives, which creates a tension with the
positive network effects assumed by many studies of two-sided markets. Hagiu (2009) accounts
for the effect of consumers’ preference for variety. He examines the effect of such variety on the
platform’s pricing strategies and discuss how the seller-side pricing structure influences sellers’ in-
novation incentives. These studies focus on innovation that drives the products offered by the
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seller-side in transaction with the buyer-side, whereas our work recognizes that the platform-owned
hardware device is another highly innovative market. We devote our attention to the the platform’s
strategies in managing this hardware market accounting for the two-sided elements.
Although studies on two-sided pricing models have been commonly based on static settings
to derive crisp insights and maintain analytical tractability, recently a growing body of research
work has begun to explore dynamic strategies in the platform context (Lin et al. (2011), Zhu and
Iansiti (2012), and Hagiu (2006)). Hagiu (2006) investigates price commitment by a platform,
where one side of the platform arrives before the other side. He finds that the platform can attract
the early-arrival side without committing to a low price for the late-arrival side. Our paper also
focuses on a dynamic pricing problem with particular attention to the quality-improving hardware
device offered by the platform. Lin et al. (2011) study sellers’ dynamic innovation race to create
products for the platform market and find implications on the platform’s pricing decisions. Rather
than focusing on sellers’ dynamics, our work considers the platform’s sequential decisions. Zhu
and Iansiti (2012) consider forward-looking consumers and focus on a platform’s entry problem
in competition with an incumbent, with constant quality. Through both analytical modeling and
empirical validation, they find that, when both the network externality and consumers’ valuation
for future applications are sufficient low, a platform entrant may capture its market with quality
advantage. Our results coincide with theirs by also indicating these two factors to play a role in
the platform’s dynamic pricing strategies facing future cost reductions. One of the main features
that differentiate our paper is our consideration for quality improvements over time.
Network effects and other key elements of two-sided platforms have been considered in a variety
of contexts. Sun et al. (2004) finds that the strength of network effects is an important factor in
deciding which product strategy a firm should adopt among single-product monopoly, technology
licensing, product-line extension, and a combination of licensing and product-line extension strate-
gies. Our model aims to address a two-sided problem and accounts for bi-directional network effects
from/to both sides. Chen and Xie (2007) model the competition between two firms with asymmet-
ric levels of consumer loyalty for a primary product. They study the network effect exerted by the
primary product onto the market of the secondary product. Interestingly, they identify the range of
consumer loyalty for the firm with higher consumer loyalty to be at a disadvantage as a result of the
network effect. Gilbert and Jonnalagedda (2011) anchors on the concept of “contingent product,”
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which is the product that is required to consume a durable good (e.g., ink is the contingent product
of printer). They evaluate the lock-in strategy with consideration for strategic consumers and find
that the firm’s ability to commit to shutting down the production of the durable good plays an
important role. Cheng et al. (2011) evaluate net neutrality policies by studying the the broadband
service provider as a platform, which charges a fee to consumers and possibly also a price to the con-
tent provider side. By modeling two-sided pricing, they find that abolishing net neutrality benefits
the broadband service provider while taxing the content providers; the change to consumer surplus
further depends on relative capabilities of the content providers in generating revenues. Tucker and
Zhang (2010) conduct a field experiment and find that seller-side participation decisions may be
dependent on the amount of information advertised about the network size. In fact, their results
show that advertising buyer-side network size may deter seller-side participation.
This paper is also closely related to the literature on rapid sequential innovation. Our model is
similar to the setup in Dhebar (1994) and Kornish (2001), who consider the problem of a durable-
goods monopolist selling low-quality and high-quality products in the first and second period,
respectively. They examine whether there exists an equilibrium pricing strategy when the pace
of quality improvement varies. Dhebar (1994) concludes that rapid quality improvement is not
desirable even with the option of upgrading the low-quality products, whereas Kornish (2001) shows
that any large quality improvement could be optimal under different parameter settings without
offering the special upgrading pricing in the second period. Our work considers a firm producing
quality-improving hardware devices, for which upgrades are not commonly feasible; thus, we focus
on other issues such as the two-sided business model. Moreover, Dhebar (1994) considers a general
cost function of the quality and Kornish (2001) assumes zero marginal cost, whereas we adopt a
convex cost function of product quality. Our goal is to examine the impact of future cost reductions
on a firm’s pricing strategy. Bhattacharya et al. (2003) investigate how to optimally introduce high
technology products with an option of holding the low quality products until the high quality
products launch. They show that introducing low quality products before high quality products
may be still preferred. For topics on sequential innovation, Ramachandran and Krishnan (2008)
provide a detailed review.
A key component in most dynamic pricing models is strategic consumer behavior, that is, con-
sumers are forward-looking and may delay their purchases to maximize their utilities over time.
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Researchers are often interested in how a monopolist optimally prices a single product over time.
Stokey (1979) and Bulow (1982) show that a monopolist is forced to price at the marginal cost;
Besanko and Winston (1990) prove that the optimal price decreases over time due to consumers’
strategic behavior. By taking into account capacity constraints/inventory, the literature in oper-
ations management shows that markdown or markup could be optimal (see Su (2007) and Aviv
and Pazgal (2008)). Liu and Zhang (2012) extend the model of Besanko and Winston (1990) to a
duopoly market with vertically differentiated products and obtain a similar optimal pricing strat-
egy. Our work emphasizes the role of production cost in the firm’s and consumers’ decisions. We
show that, as future production cost decreases, consumers’ strategic behaviors make possible for the
firm to raise the price of the low-quality product in the first period and to raise or lower the price
of the high-quality product in the second period, depending on the extent of quality improvement.
3 Buyer-Side Only (Baseline Case)
Consider a monopoly firm3 that produces a low-quality product in the first period and offers a
product of an improved quality in the second period. We focus on the case of durable goods;
thus, buyers purchase either quality of product but not both. Since the product of interest is a
hardware product, unlike in the case of software products, buyers cannot simply update the low-
quality version to obtain the high-quality version. Moreover, suppose that the second-hand market,
if present, only has a negligible impact on the primary market. Let qi and pi denote the quality
and the selling price of product i respectively, for i = L,H. We assume that qi is exogenously
determined and that the firm is unable to commit in advance to future prices. The firm sets the
price pL in period 1 and pH in period 2 with the objective of maximizing the total profit over the
two periods. Following the common assumption (Netessine and Taylor (2007)), let the production
cost be a convex function in quality: The costs of the low and high-quality products in period t are
βtq
2
L and βtq
2
H respectively, where 0 < βt < 1 can be interpreted as the costliness of quality. Also,
for notational simplicity, denote by α the common per-period discount factor for both the firm and
buyers, although our results hold when the firm’s discount factor is greater than that of the buyers.
Consider a continuum of buyers of density µ. We assume that buyers are characterized by their
3The term “platform” is used for the two-sided case in Section 4 to distinguish from the current setting where we
use the term “firm.”
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valuation (or willingness-to-pay) for one unit of quality in the product. A buyer with valuation
θ receives utility θqi − pi from buying one unit of product i for i = L,H and does not gain from
any additional units. Without loss of generality, let the utility of buying nothing be zero. A buyer
purchases the either the low- or high-quality product (in period 1 or 2, respectively) that gives him
the higher utility, provided that the utility is positive. Furthermore, the firm cannot identify the θ
value for each buyer, but it observes that θ is uniformly distributed over [0, 1]. Both the firm and
buyers have rational expectations.
Let θH be the valuation of the buyer who is indifferent between purchasing the high-quality
product in period 2 and nothing; that is, θHqH − pH = 0. And let θ2 be the valuation of the buyer
who is indifferent between purchasing in period 1 and period 2: θ2qL − pL = α(θ2qH − pH). Then,
given pL and pH , θH and θ2 are determined by θH =
pH
qH
and θ2 =
pL−αpH
qL−αqH respectively.
We follow the assumption adopted in the literature that innovation is not “too rapid,” such that
quality only improves in absolute terms and not in present-value terms (i.e., qL > αqH) (Liu and
Zhang (2012)). Violation of this condition rules out the subgame-perfect equilibrium for sequential
product introduction (see Dhebar (1994)), implying that the optimal pricing strategy may lead to
consumer regret. As a result, buyers with higher valuations are early adopters of the low-quality
product in period 1, whereas those with lower valuations may purchase the high-quality product
in period 2. If a buyer with valuation θ purchases in period t, buyers with θˆ > θ who have not yet
purchased will clearly also make the purchase in the same period. Therefore, θ2 serves as the state
variable indicating the number of remaining buyers in the market in the beginning of period 2.
The timeline of events are as follows (Figure 1): In period 1, the firm sets price pL, and buyers
decide whether to purchase the low-quality product based on pL and their rational expectations of
the future price pH of the high-quality product. In period 2, the firm sets price pH according to
the state of the market θ2, and buyers who have not yet made the purchase (i.e, with valuations
lower than θ2 and higher than θH), decide whether to purchase the high-quality product.
The firm’s profit functions in periods 2 and 1 are, respectively:
Π2(pH) = (θ2 − pH
qH
)(pH − β2q2H)µ,
Π1(pL) = (1− θ2)(pL − β1q2L)µ+ αΠ2(θ2).
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Figure 1: Overview with Buyer-Side Only
Without loss of generality, we normalize µ to 1 in the analysis.
We derive the optimal price in the each period (see Appendix B.1), based on which compara-
tive statics yield the effect of future cost reductions on the firm’s strategies and buyers’ purchasing
decisions. Firms commonly anticipate lower future costs as a result of technological advancement,
learning-by-doing by the manufacturers, and contractual agreements with its suppliers in practice.
Such reductions in future costs are critical to the firm’s dynamic pricing decisions, and, conse-
quently, buyers’ strategic purchasing behaviors.
Proposition 1. Cost reductions in period 2 induce the firm to raise the price (of the low-quality
product) in period 1, which leads to a demand shift from period 1 (low-quality product) to period 2
(high-quality product).
Reductions in future production costs increases profitability of the high-quality product; thus,
the firm is inclined to expand the future market. The optimal strategy is then to raise the price
in period 1, which not only extracts more surplus from the buyers who are early adopters but
also creates a larger market for period 2. Facing a higher price in period 1, only buyers with the
highest valuation purchase early, allowing the firm to price-discriminate more aggressively. More
buyers are then willing to delay purchase – an expanded market emerges in period 2. The firm’s
pricing strategy in period 2 must align with buyers’ rational expectations such that those who delay
purchase are indeed better off giving up consumption in period 1.
The quality gap cross periods is a key factor in the effect of cost reductions on the price in
period 2. To examine the conditions of quality gap, we first define an indicator function describing
the quality ratio, qLqH , relative to the discount factor, α: f(
qL
qH
) = 5α − 4 qLqH . Notice that f(·) is
monotonically decreasing in the quality ratio so that the indicator also increases when the quality
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gap increases. Moreover, we define the critical quality ratio δ ≡ 5α4 , such that f(δ) = 0. The
(qH , qL)-space can be divided into three regions shown in Figure 2 and characterized in Table 1
(note that since α < δ, f(α) > f(δ) = 0).
I"
III"
II"
qH 
qL 
qL =αqH 
 
Quality"Gap""
Widens""
qL = qH 
 
qL = δqH 
 
Figure 2: Three Regions in the (qH , qL)-Space
Table 1: Regions of the (qH , qL)-Space
Region Quality Ratio Adj. Quality Gap Extent of Quality Improvement
Region I qLqH < α – – Not Feasible
Region II α < qLqH ≤ δ f(
qL
qH
) ≥ 0 Major Quality Improvement
Region III qLqH > δ f(
qL
qH
) < 0 Minor Quality Improvement
In Figure 2, only the area below the 45-degree line (qL = qH) is feasible for the given quality
levels to ensure qL < qH . Region I is also not feasible because we are interested in quality improve-
ment in absolute terms only. The quality gap widens from Region III to Region II, leading to the
following proposition.
Proposition 2. 2a. For a major quality improvement in period 2 (i.e., in Region II), cost re-
ductions in period 2 induces the firm to raise the optimal price in period 2 (for the high-quality
products). Meanwhile, the total demand across the two periods decreases.
2b. For a minor quality improvement in period 2 (i.e., in Region III), cost reductions in period
2 induces the firm to lower the optimal price in period 2 (for the high-quality products). Meanwhile,
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the total demand across the two periods increases.
The firm can leverage cost reductions in period 2 either to position its product line to the high-
end market or to increase the total market share. In the former strategy, the firm raises the price of
the high-quality product in period 2 (as well as that of the low-quality product in period 1 as shown
in Proposition 1) in response to cost reductions. This result contrasts sharply with the theory that
lower costs lead to lower prices, which is applicable in a static setting. In a dynamic setting, the
price increase in period 1 creates an forward demand shift that brings a group of buyers with high
valuations to period 2; a sufficiently substantial quality improvement then allows the firm to exploit
these buyers and raise the price in period 2. Even though the total market share is reduced, the
price increase in both periods induces buyers to time their purchases such that the firm obtains a
higher margin from all purchases.
The firm follows the latter strategy of lowering the price of the high-quality product in period
2 (while raising that of the low-quality product in period 1 as shown in Proposition 1) in response
to cost reductions, only when the quality improvement in period 2 is not substantial. In this case,
the firm cannot raise the price in period 2 high enough to extract sufficient surplus from the buyers
with higher valuations; thus, instead, its optimal strategy is to lower the price to capture a bigger
market.
Future cost reductions have several strategic implications for the firm. It may be a powerful
leverage to raise all prices in the present and in the future (Propositions 1 and 2a), as long as the
firm also anticipates major quality improvements for newer versions of the product. Through these
pricing strategies, the firm in effect re-segments the market in favor of the future market, which is
made more profitable due to cost reductions. In the spirit of second-degree price discrimination,
the firm not only exploits buyers with sufficiently high valuations to purchase early, it may also
extract more surplus from those who switch to delay purchase. The outcome of such strategic price
adjustments is the exclusion of buyers with lower valuations. As a result, anticipating future cost
reductions allows the firm to profit more from fewer buyers.
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4 Two-Sided Pricing
In this section, we extend the analysis to examine a product that is a platform for two groups of
users. For example, smartphones provide a marketplace for transactions of applications between
the buyer-side and the seller-side (or developer-side). Building on the model in Section 3, we now
also consider the seller-side of the platform. The two-sidedness significantly alters and complicates
the platform’s pricing problem. The platform not only faces a dynamic problem in setting the
price of the hardware product on the buyer-side, it also prices the seller-side fee; in addition, the
cross-side network externality is an important factor in the platform’s optimal two-sided pricing
decision. We investigate the effects of future cost reductions in the two-sided setting and contrast
the results with those in Section 3.
In deriving analytical results, we focus on the case where the seller-side demand is increasing
in the buyer-side network size, and the buyer-side demand is determined by their preference for
quality following the setup in Section 3. This simplification allows the model to remain tractable
as we examine the role of quality in the platform’s dynamic, two-sided pricing strategy. To also
incorporate the network externality from the seller-side to the buyer-side, we perform numerical
analysis with network externalities on both sides in Section 5 and show that the findings are
qualitatively consistent with the analytical results in this section. Thus, the analytical findings
in the current section provides the theoretical insights for the impact of future cost reductions
on the platform’s two-sided pricing strategies. Furthermore, it is applicable to fully-developed
platforms that have established a critical mass of sellers, in which case buyers’ purchasing decisions
are primarily reliant on the characteristics of the product itself. For example, given the large
developer network in Apple’s App Store, buyers’ iPhone purchase decisions are mainly based on
the functionality of the device. In another example, when consumers choose between Visa and
Mastercard, their primary decision factor is not as much about the number of merchants honoring
the card as it is about the quality of service and the promotions offered by the card.
4.1 Model Setup
In addition to the buyer-side price as in Section 3, in period t, t ∈ {1, 2}, the platform charges a
fixed fee st to sellers upon joining. Let the seller-side demand decrease in si at the rate of k, as a
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result of the quantity effect. We adopt a linear demand function on the seller-side: For a buyer-side
network of size Θ, the seller-side demand function is vtΘ − kst, where vt is the marginal network
effect exerted by the buyer-side in period t. We assume all agents have rational expectations about
the future as they maximize utility (or payoffs).
The timeline is similar to that in Section 3 with the addition of seller-side fees in each period
(Figure 3). In period 1, the platform sets prices charged on both sides s1 and pL; observing these
prices, sellers and buyers make their participation and purchasing decisions, respectively. In period
2, the platform introduces a higher quality of device for buyers and sets s2 and pH ; sellers and the
remaining buyers make their participation and purchasing decisions, respectively.
01
Period 1
Buyers
Platform



Sellers
Period 2
Platform



 1 −  −    −  − 
Figure 3: Overview in the Two-Sided Case
The platform’s profit functions in two periods now include revenues generated on the seller-side:
Π2(pH , s2) = (θ2 − pH
qH
)(pH − β2q2H)µ+ s2
[
v2(θ2 − pH
qH
)− ks2
]
,
Π1(pL, s1) = (1− θ2)(pL − β1q2L)µ+ s1 [v1(1− θ2)− ks1] + αΠ2(θ2).
As in the buyer-sided model, µ is normalized to 1; here, v1, v2 and k are also scaled accordingly.
4.2 Results
Here, the platform adopts a new set of strategies in period 2, in contrast with those when only
the buyer-side is present. Lemma 1 characterizes the optimal buyer-side price, the valuation of the
buyer who is indifferent between purchasing the high-quality product and consuming nothing, and
the optimal seller-side fee in period 2. To simplify notation, we define W ≡ v222kqH .
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Lemma 1. Given θ2 (the buyer with the highest valuation in period 2), the optimal price of the
high-quality product, the buyer with the lowest valuation, and the optimal seller-side fee in this
period are given by
p∗H =
θ2qH + β2q
2
H − θ2 v
2
2
2k
2−W (1)
θ∗H =
θ2 + β2qH − θ2W
2−W (2)
s∗2 =
v2
2k
(θ2 − p
∗
H
qH
). (3)
Let us inspect the optimal buyer-side price in period 2 with and without the seller-side (Eq.
(2) and Eq. (9)). The comparison provides an illustration of the effect of network externality
independent of intertemporal issues. The expressions of p∗H in the two cases show that, with the
seller-side, both the denominator and the numerator of p∗H are reduced. These two differences
create forces acting in opposite directions.
First, in the two-sided case, the platform’s total profit is less sensitive to changes in the buyer-
side price. With two-sided pricing, when the platform reduces the buyer-side price, it must also
adjust the seller-side fee. Thus, a lower buyer-side price not only stimulates the buyer-side demand,
but it also strengthens the network effect. Moreover, because of the expanding buyer-side demand
the network effect intensifies at an increasing rate, as the buyer-side price further decreases. As a
result, in the two-sided case, the platform reduces the buyer-side price at a higher rate than in the
one-sided case to also take advantage of the seller-side profit gain. The similar intuition applies
when the platform adjusts the buyer-side price upward. This price increase weakens the network
effect and at a decreasing rate. Overall, the total profits from the two sides are less responsive to the
changes in the buyer-side price, compared with the case when the platform derives revenues solely
from the buyers. The intuition of the second force is straightforward. The seller-side introduces
the incentive for the platform to obtain more buyers to generate profits on the seller-side; thus,
the buyer-side price is shifted downward. The net effect determines the difference in the buyer-side
price with and without the consideration for the seller-side.
From Equations (2) and (3), we also observe that the platform optimally adjusts the buyer-side
price and the seller-side fee in opposite directions. Intuitively, an increase in the buyer-side price
diminishes the network effect on the seller-side and reduces the optimal seller-side fee. When the
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buyer-to-seller network effect is weakened, the platform has less to gain on the seller-side; thus, the
optimal seller-side fee decreases in order to generate more demand on the seller-side. The platform’s
optimal seller-side profits are also reduced.
Next we find the optimal results in period 1 and examine their properties.
Lemma 2. In period 1, the optimal price for the low-quality product, the valuation of the buyer who
is indifferent between purchasing the high-quality product and low-quality product, and the optimal
seller-side fee are given by:
p∗L =
((2−W )qL − αqH)
[
(2−W )qL − αqH + (2−W )β1q2L − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
]
− α2β2q3H
(2−W )[2(2−W )qL − 3αqH ]− v
2
1
2k (2−W )2
−
v21
2k (2−W )αβ2q2H
(2−W )[2(2−W )qL − 3αqH ]− v
2
1
2k (2−W )2
(4)
θ∗2 =
(2−W )qL − αqH + (2−W )β1q2L − 2αβ2q2H − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
(5)
s∗1 =
v1
2k
(1− θ∗2) (6)
Comparing p∗L in the cases with and without the seller-side, the differences are similar to those
for p∗H – both the numerator and the denominator are reduced when the seller-side is introduced.
Similar to the discussion for p∗H , the seller-side helps to smooths out the sensitivity of the total
profits generated in period 1, which leads to an increase in price. Meanwhile, the platform also has
the incentive to reduce the price to attract more buyers and profit on the seller-side.
Aside from the same-period cross-side tradeoffs, the platform’s pricing strategy in period 1 also
depends on how the platform balances profits on the two sides in period 2. Notice that, in Eq. (5),
the presence of the seller-side in period 2 affects buyers’ intertemporal purchase decisions. Thus,
introducing the seller-side complicates the platform’s strategies due to the interactions between
prices on the two sides as well as the dynamic effects. The combination of these forces generates
the net difference in the price in period 1 compared to the case without the seller-side.
Proposition 3. Cost reductions in period 2 shift demand from period 1 (low-quality product) to
period 2 (high-quality product). In the meantime, the platform’s optimal strategy is to raise the
price (of the low-quality product) in period 1, given cost reductions in period 2.
Proposition 1 from the one-sided setting applies to the current two-sided case. Considerations
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for the seller-side does not alter the qualitative effect of future cost reductions on the platform’s
pricing strategies in period 1: Cost reductions increase profitability in period 2 and induce a forward
intertemporal demand shift. It is optimal for the platform to encourage buyers’ tendency to delay
purchase to the more profitable period by raising the buyer-side price in period 1. This also allows
the platform to extract more surplus from those who remain in period 1.
The difference between the one-sided and two-sided business models is that adjustments of the
buyer-side price in period 1 for a two-sided platform not only trigger an intertemporal demand shift
but also affect the strengths of the network externality in both periods. Intuitively, the strength of
the network externality is transferred in the direction of the intertemporal demand shift; in other
words, as more buyers delay their purchases, the platform loses some buyer-side demand now but
will gain a stronger network effect later. This does not impact the platform’s pricing strategy
qualitatively because the platform simultaneously optimizes the seller-side profit, which balances
cross-period tradeoffs in network externalties. We identify the intertemporal seller-side tradeoffs
in Proposition 4 and further contrast the two-sided business model with the case with only the
buyer-side in the following propositions.
Proposition 4. Cost reductions in period 2 raise the optimal fee and profits on the seller-side in
period 2, but lower the optimal fee and profits on the seller-side in period 1.
Future cost reductions not only incentivize the platform to shift the buyer-side demand to the
future market, they also sharpen the difference in the seller-side profitability by weighing toward the
future. The forward shift of the buyer-side demand transfers the strength of the network externality
from period 1 to period 2. Thus, the platform is able to raise the seller-side fee in period 2, based
on its offering of an expanded user base of buyers. As a result, for a two-sided business model, the
platform gains from cost reductions of the future market in terms of both the sales of devices on
the buyer-side and the revenues generated from the fees on the seller-side. The additional benefits
from the seller-side in period 2 may increase the leverage that the platform obtains from future
cost reductions compared to the one-sided case, as shown in Propositions 5 and 6.
Proposition 5. In the two-sided setting, the intertemporal demand shift due to future cost reduc-
tions is more pronounced than in the one-sided case. Moreover, the platform raises the optimal
price in period 1 more aggressively in the two-sided case than in the one-sided case.
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In the two-sided business model, the platform can raise the buyer-side price in period 1 more
aggressively than in the one-sided case. Raising the buyer-side price in period 1 allows the platform
not only to expand the buyer-side market in period 2 (same as in the one-sided case) but also to
profit further on the seller-side in period 2 through the intensified buyer-to-seller network external-
ity, as shown in Proposition 4. The latter (seller-side profits in period 2) increases the incentives
for the former (creating more buyer-side demand in period 2); as a result, the platform’s optimal
strategy is to raise the buyer-side price in period 1 at a higher rate than in the one-sided case.
The implication is that, in a two-sided business model, the network externality empowers the
platform to more aggressively price discriminate and more effectively segment the market intertem-
porally, when anticipating future cost reductions. As more focus is shifted to period 2, the platform
only captures the most eager-to-buy consumers with the low-quality product and is able charge
them a high premium for early adoption. The sales of the first iPhone highlight this point. While
predicting a significant drop in production costs, Apple set a steep price for the first iPhone. The
early adopters were mostly technology fanatics, who valued the revolutionary design of the iPhone
at the time. In comparison, adopters of later versions of the iPhone were more driven by the
hardware quality improvements and, very importantly, the rapidly growing App Store.
Proposition 6. 6a. For a major quality improvement in period 2 (i.e., in Region II), cost reduc-
tions in period 2 induce the platform to raise the buyer-side price (for the high-quality product).
Furthermore, the rate of increase is higher with the consideration for the seller-side. And, the total
demand across the two periods decreases.
6b. For a minor quality improvement (i.e., in Region III), cost reductions in period 2 may
nevertheless induce the platform to raise the buyer-side price (for the high-quality product), if the
network effect in period 1, v1, is sufficiently strong. Under certain conditions of the strengths of
network effects in both periods (v1 and v2), the platform may lower the price, given cost reductions
in period 2.
Consistent with the one-sided case, here a substantial quality improvement also enables the
platform to raise the price of the high-quality product given cost reductions in period 2. Because
the demand shift forward is more pronounced in the two-sided case, the future market is populated
with more buyers with high valuations. This alone allows the platform to extract higher surplus
from these additional buyers by raising the price in period 2 more aggressively. Furthermore, recall
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that, in the two-sided case, the platform’s total profit is less sensitive to changes in the buyer-side
price compared to the one-sided case; thus, the platform has more power to impose a higher price
increase on the buyer-side to enjoy a higher profit.
Proposition 6b further suggests that the network externality allows the platform to raise the
buyer-side price in scenarios where price increase is not possible for the one-sided business model.
When the quality improvement is not sufficiently substantial, whereas in the one-sided case, antic-
ipating cost reductions, the firm’s optimal strategy is to cut the price of the high-quality product
(Proposition 2b), the two-sided business model may enable the platform to raise the price never-
theless, depending on the strength of the network externality. This is a result of the intertemporal
effects of network externality. In period 1, the network externality mitigates the responsiveness
of the total profits to changes in the buyer-side price; thus, with a stronger network externality,
the platform tends to raise the buyer-side price more aggressively while compensating for it by
lowering the seller-side fee. The intensified shift of the buyer-side demand to period 2 provides
the platform with the opportunity to extract additional surplus from buyers by raising the price
higher, even when the quality improvement is not as significant. Therefore, with a sufficiently
strong network externality, the intertemporal effect may reinforce the price increase despite the
minor quality improvement.
On the other hand, when the network externality is sufficiently strong in period 2, the platform
may lower the price of the high-quality product given reduced costs. This is intuitive because the
more benefit each additional buyer generates, the more the platform is inclined to cut the buyer-
side price so as to attract a larger buyer-side network and to raise the seller-side fee for a higher
seller-side profit.
The network externality in a two-sided business model clearly plays an important role in the
firm’s pricing strategies. Thus far, for analytical tractability, we have only consider the buyer-
to-seller externality, which yields fundamental insights on how such network externality impact
the platform’s and buyers’ decisions. In the following section, we also incorporate the network
externality from the seller-side to the buyer-side to examine the full picture of a two-sided platform’s
strategies.
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5 Numerical Study
In this section, we consider a two-sided model with the network externalities in both directions
between the buyer-side and the seller-side. Let γt denote each buyer’s marginal utility for an
additional seller on the other side of the platform; that is, γt measures the strength of the network
effect of the seller-side on the buyer-side in period t. The utility function of a buyer with θ in
period t is then θqt + γt(vtΘt − kst)qt − pt, where qt = qL, pt = pL for t = 1, qt = qH , pt = pH for
t = 2, and Θt is the buyer-side network size determined by all buyers’ preferences based on this
utility function. Hence, θH and θ2 satisfy the following conditions:
(θH + γ2(v2(θ2 − θH)− ks2))qH − pH = 0,
(θ2 + γ1(v1(1− θ2)− ks1))qL − pL = α((θ2 + γ2(v2(θ2 − θH)− ks2))qH − pH).
The platform’s profit in the two periods are:
Π2(pH , s2) = (θ2 − θH)(pH − β2q2H)µ+ s2(v2(θ2 − θH)− ks2),
Π1(pL, s1) = (1− θ2)(pL − β1q2L)µ+ s1(v1(1− θ2)− ks1) + αΠ2.
Without loss of generality, µ is normalized to 1, and v1, v2 and k are scaled accordingly. Fol-
lowing the method in Section 4, we obtain the expressions of pH and s2 in terms of θ2 using the
FOCs of Π2 with respect to pH and s2. However, model complexity does not permit derivation of
the expressions for pL and s1. Therefore, we use numerical analysis to compute these values and
examine the effect of future cost reductions on the platform’s and buyers’ decisions.
We test a wide range of numerical values that satisfy the conditions to ensure concavity of the
profit function and bounds of buyer valuations. In particular, the value of the indicator function
f(·), which characterizes the relationship between quality levels and the discount factor, is an
important determinant for the effect of cost reduction on the price of high-quality product. Thus,
we consider different combinations of β2 and α while fixing other parameters: qL, qH , β1, v1, v2, k, γ1,
and γ2. We verify the robustness of the qualitative results based on different feasible values of these
parameters that satisfy conditions specified in Section 4. In accordance with these conditions, we
vary β2 values in the range of 0.05 to 0.3.
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The numerical results show that the price of the low-quality product increases and the buyer
demand of low-quality product decreases as the cost in period 2 decreases, which is consistent with
Propositions 3. Figure 4 shows the result for α = 0.55. When β2 decreases, θ2 increases, indicating
that the demand is shifted from period 1 to period 2. Because cost reduction in period 2 increases
the profitability of the high-quality product, the platform can generate a higher profit by raising
the price of the low-quality product and thus pushing more buyers to the more profitable market.
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Figure 4: Demand and Price of Low-Quality Product in Period 1
Figure 5 illustrates the results for the price and profit on the seller-side in period 1. Since more
buyers are inclined to delay their purchase, the network externality enables the platform to raise
the seller-side fee in period 2 but lower the fee in period 1, which coincides with Proposition 4. As
a result, the profit on the seller-side decreases in period 1 and increases in period 2.
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Figure 5: Optimal Fee and Profit on Seller-Side in Period 1
Figure 6 compares the changes in the price of the low-quality product and the demand in period
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1 in the cases of one-sided and two-sided business models, as the cost in period 2 decreases. Again,
the finding revealed is consistent with that in Section 4 (Proposition 5): The two-sided business
model provides the platform additional benefits of setting a higher price of the low-quality product
and shifting more buyers from the low-quality product market to the high-quality product market.
With the seller-side, more buyers tend to purchase the high-quality product for a higher surplus;
and the platform enjoys a higher profit generated on the seller-side due to the network externality
and thus raises the price of the low-quality product further.
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Figure 6: Demand and Price of low-quality Product for One-sided and Two-sided Model
Following Proposition 6, here cost reductions in period 2 lead to a higher price of the high-
quality product due to the demand shift from period 1 to period 2 if the higher quality product
improves the quality substantially (Region II). Moreover, the rate of increase is higher with the
consideration of the seller-side. However, when the quality improvement is less substantial (in
Region III), the firm may lower the price of the high-quality product since the quality improvement
is not sufficiently appealing to attract more buyers at a higher price. Figure 7 demonstrates the
results for Region II (α = 0.7) and Region III (α = 0.55).
Although considering the network externalities in both directions significantly complicates the
model, we derive the same insights as those obtained analytically based on unidirectional externality
in Section 4. The intuitions offered by the analytical model can be extended to understand the
consistency in findings. The addition of the seller-to-buyer network externality does not conflict
with the platform’s intertemporal incentives. In Section 4, we find that in the two-sided case the
platform induces more buyers to delay purchase by raising prices higher compared to the one-
sided case, because buyers in period 2 can indirectly generate additional profits for the platform
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Figure 7: Price of high-quality Product in Region II and III
by attracting more sellers. Here, when sellers also have this effect on the buyer-side demand, the
platform nevertheless relies more on period 2 for profits relative to period 1. In fact, shifting
buyers to period 2 not only stimulates the seller-side demand, the effect also feeds back on the
buyer-side and induces more buyers to purchase in period 2. Whereas qualitative insights are
consistent whether the externality is unidirectional or bidirectional, there may be quantitative
differences depending on the strength of each network externality. Based on our parameter values,
such quantitative differences are insignificant compared to the values that lead to the qualitative
results.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper, we examine a monopolistic firm’s dynamic pricing decisions facing future cost re-
ductions, when it introduces quality-improving products sequentially. We compare strategies of a
firm that only sells to buyers with those of a platform that markets to both buyers and sellers,
where cross-side network externalities are present. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, we find
that future cost reductions enable the firm to raise the price of the current product and as well as
24
that of the future product that has a sufficiently high quality. Thus, future cost reductions shift
the demand forward and enable high-end positioning of the product line. Furthermore, whereas
the one-sided and two-sided business models allow the firm to adopt the similar strategy, in the
two-sided case the network externalities offer the platform a stronger leverage to raise price because
the the network externalities further stimulate the demand and profits in the future market.
This study underscores important factors, in addition to network externality, to be considered
by platform owners that are entering the hardware market. Driven by innovative technologies,
platform owners’ pricing decisions not only depend on the strength of network externalities between
different groups of users, successful two-sided pricing strategies also account for intricate interplays
between network externality and other hardware-relevant factors. In the case of Apple, securing
future cost discounts through negotiation with hardware factories upfront has enabled the company
to optimally segment the market across multiple releases through strategic pricing. Anticipating
future cost reductions, Apple paces consumers’ adoption of different versions of iPad to gradually
achieve a remarkable market saturation. A steep price of the first iPad (relative to other tablets)
achieves both the positioning of the product as a premium tablet and sufficient market demand
for more attractive, later versions. In the meantime, the cross-side network externality spurs the
growth of the App Store, which currently features over 500,000 applications. In the emerging trend
of platform-owned hardware devices, Google, Microsoft and other major players also face dynamic
decisions for pricing hardware for their types of platforms. We provide guidelines for considering
the key factors jointly.
Our findings also offer new theoretical insights into cannibalization in an intertemporal context.
When high-quality product cannot be offered before the low-quality product, we can leverage future
cost reductions to mitigate the intertemporal cannibalization problem. The firm’s strategy to raise
price in response to future cost reductions suggests that overestimating future costs may lead to
product underpricing. Anticipating a higher future cost drives the firm to capture more demand
early on by cutting the price. A suboptimally low price of the product introduced early cannibalizes
the demand for the future product, which in turn leads to further underpricing. This is because
buyers with high valuation opt for the underpriced product early on, and the buyers remaining
in the market have low willingness to pay when the higher-quality product becomes available.
Therefore, without accurately anticipating future costs, the firm could face a severe intertemporal
25
cannibalization problem, which incurs profit losses due to underpricing.
By comparing the one-sided and two-sided cases, our results suggest that it is even more im-
portant for a firm with a two-sided business model to reduce and accurately estimate future costs.
Here the potential cost of intertemporal cannibalization is exacerbated because the buyer-side de-
mand in the future market has an additional effect of attracting more sellers; the cross-side network
externality feeds back on the buyer-side demand, expanding the market significantly and yielding
profit gains for the platform. As the platform balances its intertemporal tradeoffs, the presence
of network externalities further emphasizes the more profitable market, inducing the platform to
allocate more demand to the market where cost reduction occurs. Therefore, a two-sided platform
enjoys a greater advantage by lowering and anticipating future costs and holds more market power
to position its current and future products to the high-end market.
A few limitations exist in the current paper and point to several directions for future research.
First, we assume that the firm discontinues the low-quality product when the high-quality product
is introduced. In practice, the low-quality product may continue to be on market. Appendix B.2
formulates an extension of the model from Section 3 and shows that our findings still hold when
the low-quality product remains in period 2. However, studying this scenario in a two-sided model
requires additional assumptions about compatibility issues on both sides of the platform for co-
existing qualities. The topic of this extension is beyond the scope of this work. Another interesting
extension is to consider variations in buyers’ purchasing behavior beside the typical “unit demand”
for durable goods. One possibility is for some buyers to demand multiple products of different
qualities. A related direction is that in the second-hand market, which emerges through many
online channels for many types of products. Existing users then have the option of upgrading their
current device by selling their products and then buying a newer and better version. The firm faces
strategic policy decisions when the second-hand market becomes sufficiently dominant.
Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3 The firm’s profit function is:
Π2(pH) = (θ2 − θH)(pH − β2q2H) = (θ2 −
pH
qH
)(pH − β2q2H).
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The first-order condition gives p∗H =
θ2qH+β2q
2
H
2 and θ
∗
H =
pH
qH
= θ2+β2qH2 .
Proof of Lemma 4 Taking into account θ∗2, the firm’s expected profit in period 1 is
Π1(pL) = (1− θ∗2(pL))(pL − β1q2L) +
αqH
4
(θ∗2(pL)− β2qH)2
The FOC wrt pL is
(2qL − αqH − 4pL + 2β1q2L + αβ2q2H)(2qL − αqH) + αqH(2pL − αβ2q2H)− αβ2q2H(2qL − αqH) = 0
From our assumption of moderate innovation with qL > αqH , we have −8qL + 6αqH < 0 and
the SOC is ∂
2Π1
∂p2L
= −8qL+6αqH
(2qL−αqH)2 < 0. We can obtain the optimal price as shown in Eq. (12). By
substituting p∗L into Eq. (11), we get expression for θ
∗
2 as shown in Eq. (13).
Notice that θ2 must satisfy θH ≤ θ2 ≤ 1, therefore we need the following conditions.
β2qH ≤ 2qL − αqH + 2β1q
2
L − 2αβ2q2H
4qL − 3αqH ≤ 1 (7)
Proof of Proposition 1 In period 1, the demand for the low-quality product is 1− θ∗2.
∂(1− θ∗2)
∂β2
=
2q2Hα
4qL − 3αqH > 0.
The demand for the high-quality product in period 2 is θ∗2 − θ∗H .
∂(θ∗2 − θ∗H)
∂β2
=
−q2Hα
4qL − 3αqH < 0 and
∂p∗1,L
∂β2
=
−α2q3H
8qL − 6αqH < 0
Proof of Proposition 2 In Region II
∂p∗H
∂β2
=
−2q3Hα
8qL − 5αqH +
q2H
2
=
q2H
2
[
4qL − 5αqH
4qL − 3αqH
]
=
q3H
2
[
f1(
qL
qH
)
4qL − 3αqH
]
≥ 0.
The total demand is 1− θ∗H , and
∂(1− θ∗H)
∂β2
= −∂(θ
∗
H)
∂β2
= −qH ∂p
∗
H
∂β2
≥ 0.
In Region III,
∂p∗H
∂β2
=
q3H
2
[
f1(
qL
qH
)
4qL − 3αqH
]
< 0 and
∂(1− θ∗H)
∂β2
= −∂(θ
∗
H)
∂β2
= −qH ∂p
∗
H
∂β2
< 0.
Proof of Lemma 1 The expected profit function is
Π2(pH , s2) = (θ2 − pH
qH
)(pH − β2q2H) + s2
[
v2(θ2 − pH
qH
)− ks2
]
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By taking the FOC w.r.t. s2, we get
s∗2 =
v2
2k
(θ2 − pH
qH
).
Substituting s∗2 into the profit function yields,
Π2(pH , s2) = (θ2 − pH
qH
)(pH − β2q2H) +
v22
4k
(θ2 − pH
qH
)2.
The FOC wrt to pH gives us
p∗H =
θ2qH + β2q
2
H − θ2 v
2
2
2k
2−W .
The SOC wrt to pH requires the concavity condition: 2−W > 0.
Proof of Lemma 2 Plugging Eq. (2) for p∗H into the profit function, we have
Π∗2(θ2) =
(θ2 − β2qH)2
[2−W ]2
[
qH − v
2
2
4k
]
Notice that to ensure positive demand and marginal profit, the following conditions must be
satisfied:
θ2 − β2qH > 0 and qH − v
2
2
2k
> 0.
Furthermore, we derive the following to be substituted into the FOC of Π1.
∂Π2
∂θ2
=
2(qH − v
2
2
4k )
[2−W ]2 (θ2 − β2qH) =
qH
2−W (θ2 − β2qH)
The indifferent buyer θ∗2 must satisfy the following:
[2−W ] (θ∗2qL − pL) = α
[
θ∗2qH − β2q2H
]
θ∗2 =
(2−W )pL − αβ2q2H
(2−W )qL − αqH ,
where (2−W )qL−αqH > 0. Notice that, similar to the one-sided case, a reduction in the period-2
cost would induce buyers to delay purchase (higher θ∗2).
The platform’s profit function in period 1 is
Π1(pL, s1) = (1− θ∗2)(pL − β1q2L) + s1 [v1(1− θ∗2)− ks1] + αΠ∗2(θ∗2).
The FOC wrt s1 gives s
∗
1 =
v1
2k (1− θ∗2). We can rewrite the profit in period 1 as,
Π1(pL) = (1− θ∗2)(pL − β1q2L) +
v21
4k
(1− θ∗2)2 + αΠ∗2(θ∗2)
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By taking the FOC wrt pL, we get
−2(2−W )pL + (2−W )β1q2L + (2−W )qL − αqH + αβ2q2H −
v21
2k
(1− θ∗2)(2−W ) + αqH(θ∗2 − β2qH) = 0.
Therefore,
p∗L =
((2−W )qL − αqH)
[
(2−W )qL − αqH + (2−W )β1q2L − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
]
− α2β2q3H
(2−W )[2(2−W )qL − 3αqH ]− v
2
1
2k (2−W )2
−
v21
2k (2−W )αβ2q2H
(2−W )[2(2−W )qL − 3αqH ]− v
2
1
2k (2−W )2
To ensure concavity of the profit function, we have the following condition:
(2−W )[2(2−W )qL − 3αqH ]− v
2
1
2k
(2−W )2 > 0,
which implies that qL − v
2
1
4k > 0.
Using
((2−W )qL − αqH)θ∗2 = (2−W )p∗L − αβ2q2H ,
we get
θ∗2 =
(2−W )qL − αqH + (2−W )β1q2L − 2αβ2q2H − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
To ensure θ∗H ≤ θ∗2 ≤ 1, we need the following condition.
β2qH ≤
(2−W )qL − αqH + (2−W )β1q2L − 2αβ2q2H − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
≤ 1
Proof of Proposition 3
∂θ∗2
∂β2
=
−2αq2H
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
< 0. (8)
Since the demand in period 1 is 1− θ∗2, it decreases as β2 decreases.
∂p∗L
∂β2
=
q2H
[
−α2qH − v
2
1α
2k (2−W )
]
(2−W )[2(2−W )qL − 3αqH ]− v
2
1
2k (2−W )2
< 0.
Proof of Proposition 4
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∂s∗1
∂β2
=
v1
2k
[
−∂θ
∗
2
∂β2
]
> 0,
s∗2 =
v2
2k
[
θ∗2 −
p∗H
qH
]
=
v2
2k
[
θ∗2 − β2qH
2−W
]
and
∂s∗2
∂β2
=
v2
2k(2−W )
[
∂θ∗2
∂β2
− qH
]
< 0.
Since the seller-side profits is ks∗2i in period i, i ∈ {1, 2}; the results for the seller-side profits follow
immediately.
Proof of Proposition 5
∂θ∗2
∂β2
=
−2αq2H
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
,
which is greater in magnitude compared to
∂θ∗2
∂β2
in the one-sided case because the numerators are
equal and 2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k (2−W ) < 4qL − 3αqH .
To compare the intensity of the price increase on p∗L in one-sided and two-sided cases, we find
the difference of the magnitude of
∂p∗L
∂β2
, i.e.
∣∣∣∂p∗L∂β2 ∣∣∣ = −∂p∗L∂β2 , in the two cases. Let ∆ denote the
amount that
∣∣∣∂p∗L∂β2 ∣∣∣ is greater in the two-sided case than in the one-sided case; and denote by D the
product of the denominators of
∂p∗L
∂β2
in the two cases.
D ·∆
q2H
=
[
α2qH +
v21α
2k
(2−W )
]
· [8qL − 6αqH ]−
[
α2qH
] · [(2−W )[2(2−W )qL − 3αqH ]− v21
2k
(2−W )2
]
= W (4qL − 3αqH)α2qH + v
2
1α
2k
(2−W ) [8qL − 6αqH ] +
[
(α2qH
]
[2W (2−W )qL] +
[
α2qH
] v21
2k
(2−W )2 > 0
Proof of Proposition 6
∂p∗H
∂β2
=
(
qH − v
2
2
2k
2−W
)
∂θ∗2
∂β2
+
q2H
2−W =
q2H
2−W
[
−2α(qH − v
2
2
2k )
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
+ 1
]
We first need to show that
∂p∗H
∂β2
≤ 0. To do that, we combine the numerator of the terms in the
parentheses:
4qL − 5αqH + 2αv
2
2
2k
− 2WqL − v
2
1
2k
(2−W ) = (1−W )(4qL − 5αqH) +W (2qL − 3αqH)− v
2
1
2k
(2−W )
where 4qL − 5αqH ≤ 0 in Region II; thus, 2qL − 2.5αqH ≤ 0, implying that 2qL − 3αqH < 0. Also,
notice that 1−W > 0 because qH − v
2
2
2k > 0. Therefore,
∂p∗H
∂β2
< 0.
To compare with the one-sided case, recall that in the one-sided case:
∂p∗H
∂β2
=
q2H
2
[ −2αqH
4qL − 3αqH + 1
]
If
2α(qH− v
2
2
2k
)
2(2−W )qL−3αqH− v
2
1
2k
(2−W )
> 2αqH4qL−3αqH , then the increase in p
∗
H is more pronounced in the two-sided
30
case than in the one-sided case. After multiplying the product of the numerators (
[
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
]
·
[4qL − 3αqH ]) on both sides, LHS - RHS is the following:
2α(qH − v
2
2
2k
) · [4qL − 3αqH ]− 2αqH ·
[
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k
(2−W )
]
= 2αqH [4qL − 3αqH ]− 2αv
2
2
2k
[4qL − 3αqH ]− 2αqH [4qL − 3αqH ] + 2αqH
[
2WqL +
v21
2k
(2−W )
]
= 2αqH
v21
2k
(2−W ) + 2αWqH [−2qL + 3αqH ]
In Region II, f( qLqH ) ≥ 0, meaning 2qL ≤ 2.5αqH . Thus, [−2qL + 3αqH ] > 0, implying that
LHS −RHS > 0. Therefore, the increase in p∗H is more pronounced in the two-sided case than in
the one-sided case.
∂p∗H
∂β2
=
q2H
2−W
[
−2α(qH − v
2
2
2k )
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
+ 1
]
=
q2H
2−W
[
(2−W )(2qL − 2.5αqH)− αWqH2 −
v21
2k (2−W )
4qL − 3αqH − 2WqL − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
]
where 2qL − 2.5αqH > 0 in Region III and the numerator is decreasing in v1. Therefore, for v1
sufficiently high,
∂p∗H
∂β2
≤ 0.
[
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k
(2−W )
]
· [4qL − 3αqH ] ∗
[
2α(qH − v
2
2
2k )
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
− 2αqH
4qL − 3αqH
]
=
2α
2k
[
v21qH(2−W )− v22(2qL − 3αqH)
]
< 0
Therefore,
q2H
2−W
[
−2α(qH − v
2
2
2k )
2(2−W )qL − 3αqH − v
2
1
2k (2−W )
+ 1
]
>
q2H
2
[ −2αqH
4qL − 3αqH + 1
]
> 0
B Optimal Characterization of Buyer-Side Pricing
B.1 Baseline Model with Only High-Quality Product in Period 2
We first analyze the subgame in period 2. The remaining buyers in this period have valuations over
[0, θ2). Given state θ2 and prices pL and pH , a buyer with valuation θ < θ2 purchases if doing so
yields positive surplus. Therefore, buyers with valuations in the interval [θH , θ2) purchase the high-
quality product, where θH =
pH
qH
. Lemma 3 characterizes the optimal price for the high-quality
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product and the valuation of the buyer who is indifferent between purchasing the high-quality
product and consuming nothing.
Lemma 3. Given that the remaining buyers in the second period have valuations in the interval
[0, θ2), the optimal price for the high-quality product and the lowest valuation of the buyer purchasing
the high-quality product are given by:
p∗H =
θ2qH + β2q
2
H
2
, (9)
θ∗H =
θ2 + β2qH
2
. (10)
Now we examine the firm’s pricing decision for the low-quality product in period 1. Buyers time
their purchases by comparing their utilities of consuming the products offered in the two periods.
Let θ∗2 denote the valuation of the buyer who is indifferent between purchasing in the two periods
under the optimality condition. Thus, buyers with valuation θ ≥ θ∗2 purchase in period 1. From
θ∗2qL − pL = α(θ∗2qH − p∗H(θ∗2)), we define the indifference buyer by the following expression:
θ∗2 =
2pL − αβ2q2H
2qL − αqH , (11)
where 2qL − αqH is positive.
A number of factors directly influence the value of θ∗2. Ceteris paribus, a lower product cost in
period 2 would induce buyers to delay purchase; also, a lower quality or a higher price in period 1
would have the similar effect. Using the first-order condition (FOC) of the firm’s expected profit
function in period 1, we can obtain the optimal price for the low-quality products and the optimal
indifference buyer θ∗2 as shown in Lemma 4.
Lemma 4. In period 1, the optimal price for the low-quality product and the valuation of a buyer
who is indifferent between purchasing the high-quality product and low-quality product are given by
p∗L =
(2qL − αqH + 2β1q2L)(2qL − αqH)− α2β2q3H
8qL − 6αqH (12)
θ∗2 =
2qL − αqH + 2β1q2L − 2αβ2q2H
4qL − 3αqH . (13)
32
B.2 Coexistence of High- and Low-Quality Products in Period 2
The firm’s objective is to find p∗H and p
∗
L such that Π
∗ = maxpH ,pLΠ(pH , pL). Since there is a
one-to-one correspondence between (pH , pL) and (θH , θL), the firm’s profit function in the second
period can be written as the following:
Π2(θH , θL) = (θ2 − θH)(pH − β2q2H) + (θH − θL)(pL − β2q2L)
The firm’s maximization problem is
maxθH ,θLΠ2(θH , θL)
s.t. 0 ≤ θL ≤ θH ≤ 1
Based on the FOCs, we derive:
θ∗L =
θ2 + β2qL
2
, θ∗H =
θ2 + β2(qH + qL)
2
,
p∗L =
θ2qL + β2q
2
L
2
, and p∗H =
θ2qH + β2q
2
H
2
.
Notice that p∗H remains unchanged compared to that in Section 3; as a result, θ
∗
2, the indifference
buyer between purchasing in the two periods, and p∗L are also identical to those in the main model
– Proposition 1 holds for this setting.
Reductions in the costliness of quality provide more cost savings for a product of a higher quality;
thus, cost reductions in period 2 raise profitability of the high-quality product more significantly
than that of the low-quality product. It is intuitive that, within period 2, the optimal strategy is to
induce a demand shift from the low-quality product to the high-quality product. The intertemporal
demand shift, however, further depends on the platform’s optimal strategy in setting the price of
the low-quality product in period 1.
We also need to derive the optimal price for the low-quality product in period 2, p∗L. To examine
the effect of cost reductions on this price, we first define two indicator functions that are analogous
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to f(·) defined in Section 3:
f1(
qL
qH
) = 5α− 4 qL
qH
= f˜(
qL
qH
) + 2α
f2(
qL
qH
) = 2α+ 3α(
qL
qH
)− 4( qL
qH
)2 =
qL
qH
f˜(
qL
qH
) + 2α
where f˜( qLqH ) = 3α − 4
qL
qH
. Notice that f ′1(·) < 0 and f ′′1 (·) = 0; and, f ′2(·) < 0 when qLqH > 3α8 and
f ′′2 (·) < 0.
Define δ1 ≡ 5α4 , so that f1(δ1) = 0; also, let δ2 ≡
3α+
√
(3α)2+32α
8 , so that f2(δ2) = 0. The
(qH , qL)-space can be divided into four regions shown in Figure 8: Region I with
qL
qH
< α, region II
with α < qLqH ≤ δ1, region III with δ1 <
qL
qH
≤ δ2, and region IV with δ2 < qLqH < 1.
I
III
II
qH
qL
qL = αqH
Quality Gap 
Widens qL = qH
qL = δ2qH
qL = δ1qH
IV
Figure 8: Four Regions in the (qH , qL)-Space
Lemma 5. The values of f1(·) and f2(·) depend on the quality gap (i.e., the quality ratio) as
described in Table 2.
Table 2: Regions of the (qH , qL)-Space
Region I qLqH < α Not Feasible
Region II α < qLqH ≤ δ1 f1(
qL
qH
) ≥ 0, f2( qLqH ) > 0
Region III δ1 <
qL
qH
≤ δ2 f1( qLqH ) < 0, f2(
qL
qH
) ≥ 0
Region IV qLqH > δ2 f1(
qL
qH
) < 0, f2(
qL
qH
) < 0
In Region II, f1(δ1) = 0 and f
′
1(·) < 0, so f1( qLqH ) ≥ 0. Since f˜(
qL
qH
) < 0 and qLqH < 1, f1(q) < f2(q)
for all feasible values of q and thus f2(
qL
qH
) > 0.
In Regions III & IV, f1(
qL
qH
) < 0. Since f2(δ2) = 0 and f
′
2(·) < 0, we can get f2( qLqH ) ≥ 0 for
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δ1 <
qL
qH
≤ δ2 (Region III). For qLqH > δ2 (Region IV), since δ2 >
qL
qH
> 3α8 , f2(·) is decreasing and
f2(
qL
qH
) < 0.
Propositions 2 from the main model can be extended to apply to the result regarding the
low-quality product in period 2.
Proposition 7. 7a. For a major quality improvement in period 2 (i.e., in region II), cost reductions
in period 2 induce the firm to raise the optimal price for both the low-quality and high-quality
products in period 2. As a result, the total demand over two periods decreases.
7b. For a minor quality improvement in period 2 (i.e., in region IV), cost reductions in period
2 induce the firm to lower the optimal price for both the low-quality and high-quality products in
period 2. As a result, the total demand over two periods increases.
7c. When the quality improvement is moderate (i.e., in region III), cost reductions in period 2
induce the firm to lower (raise) the optimal price for the high-quality (low-quality) product in period
2. As a result, the total demand over two periods decreases.
7a. From Lemma 5, we have f1(
qL
qH
) ≥ 0, f2( qLqH ) > 0, so
∂p∗H
∂β2
=
−q3Hα
4qL − 3αqH +
q2H
2
=
q3H
2
[ −f1( qLqH )
4qL − 3αqH
]
< 0 and
∂p∗L
∂β2
=
q2L
2
− q
2
HqLα
4qL − 3αqH = −
qLq
2
H
8qL − 6αqH f2(
qL
qH
) < 0.
The total demand is 1− θ∗L, and ∂(1−θ
∗
L)
∂β2
=
q2Hα
4qL−3αqH −
qL
2 = −qL
∂p∗2L
∂β2
> 0
7b. Lemma 5 shows f1(
qL
qH
) < 0, f2(
qL
qH
) < 0, so
∂p∗H
∂β2
=
q3H
2
[
−
f1(
qL
qH
)
4qL − 3αqH
]
> 0 and
∂p∗L
∂β2
= − qLq
2
H
8qL − 6αqH f2(
qL
qH
) > 0,
∂(1− θ∗L)
∂β2
=
q2Hα
8qL − (4γ + 2α)qH −
qL
2
= −qL∂p
∗
2L
∂β2
< 0.
7c. Lemma 5 shows f1(
qL
qH
) < 0, f2(
qL
qH
) ≥ 0, so
∂p∗H
∂β2
=
q3H
2
[
−
f1(
qL
qH
)
4qL − 3αqH
]
> 0 and
∂p∗2,L
∂β2
= − qLq
2
H
8qL − 6αqH f2(
qL
qH
) < 0,
∂(1− θ∗L)
∂β2
=
q2Hα
4qL − 3αqH −
qL
2
= −qL∂p
∗
2L
∂β2
> 0.
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